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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH

CLEARFIELD STATE BANK,
Plaintiff and
Appellant/

/
/
/

vs.

Case No. 14521
/

J. G. CONTOS, a/k/a
JAMES G. CONTOS,
Defendant and
Respondent.

/
/

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Appellant against
the Respondent seeking an Order of the Court for possession
of merchandise allegedly secured to the Plaintiff on the basis
of a secured transaction entered into by the Respondent only,
and which secured transaction was not subscribed to by the
wife of the Respondent and wherein the wife at all times has
been in possession of the secured collateral and has not acquiesced
to the transaction as between the Respondent and the Appellant
in entering into a security agreement.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon a hearing held in the Lower Court before the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, the Court held that the Respondent's
wife was not a party to the contract nor to the action before
the Lower Court and that the Court could not deprive the wife
of the Respondent of possession of property which she owns
and thereby decreeing a Judgment of no cause of action as
to the claim of the Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the Judgment of
the Lower Court denying to the Appellant the right to deprive
the wife of possession and ownership of property which she
has possessed at all times and owns.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, Clearfield State Bank, who was the
Plaintiff in the Lower Court, will be referred to herein as
the "BANK" and the Respondent, who was the Defendant in the
Lower Court, will be referred to herein as the "HUSBAND".
On or about January 4, 1974, the Bank entered into
a loan with the husband.

A secured agreement was subscribed

to only by the husband (Pl.Exh.l) and wherein all of the
household furniture, furnishings, appliances, and other
-2-

household items were pledged as security and collateral
for said loan, with the disclosure statement and listing of
the household items also being signed only by the husband
CPl.Exh.2) .
The Appellant-Bank indicated on Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,
that the items pledged were used for "personal, family or
household purposes" (Pl.Exh.21.
The husband advised the Bank, that the items were also
owned by his wife and that she absolutely refused to sign and
be a party to the secured transaction and the Bank entered into
the loan, taking the household items of the husband and wife
as security, even though the husband advised the Bank that the
wife had refused to sign, and the loan was concluded even
though the wife's signature was not obtained or subscribed to
the loan transaction (R-15).
The husband further testified, that during the entire
ten years of the husband's marriage, the wife had been gainfully
employed for Sperry Rand, Better Business Bureau of Salt Lake,
a Salt Lake dentist, the Community Credit Counseling in Ogden,
J. C. Penney1s, and other employers averaging a minimum of
$3,500.00 per year income over the ten-year period and unemployed
only during periods of childbirth. (R-15)
A Petition in Bankruptcy was filed in the United States
-3-

District Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, by
the husband and the Bankruptcy Court disclaimed any interest in
the security in February, 1975, R-28), which date of Disclaimer
was subsequent to the filing of the Complaint of the Appellant
in the Lower Court, and occurred on January, 1975, (R-2), naming
therein the husband only as a Defendant in the action of the
Lower Court, which is on appeal before this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF WIFE CANNOT
BE DETERMINED AGAINST HER WILL.
The husband entered into a secured contract with a
knowledgeable creditor, the Appellant herein, a commercial
Bank, (R-l,R-3) knowing that the collateral was being used
for personal, family, or household purposes (R-13).

The

husband had advised the Bank, that the wife was also an
owner and that she "absolutely refused to sign the secured
agreement" (R-15) , and the secured transaction was consummated
as between the husband and Bank with the signature of the
husband only (R-17).
The Appellant further had knowledge of the filing
of the Petition in Bankruptcy by the husband (R-21) and the
Appellant-Bank brought an action seeking recovery of the home
-4-

furnishings and personal property of the husband and wife
naming only the husband as a Defendant therein.
The Constitution of the State of Utah in Article XXII,
Section 2 thereof, recognizes the right of every female to
the ownership of real and personal property, either acquired
before marriage, or any property to which she may afterwards
become entitled by purchase, gift, grant, etc., and further
provides that such property acquired by the female person
shall be and remain the estate and property of such female
and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements
of her husband.
The testimony before the Court evidenced that the
wife had been employed during the entire ten years of her
marriage to the husband, except for periods of childbearing,
and that the monies for the acquisition of the household
furniture and furnishings came from both the husband and wife,
together with a loan made from the wife's mother, to acquire
the household goods (R-15).
78-23-1 (1 through 14), Utah Code Annotated, as amended
1953, and as amended laws of Utah 1969, specifically establishes
the exemption of items of household furniture, furnishings,
appliances, and other specific goods, and the holding of the
-5-

Utah Supreme Court in Kimball v. Salisbury, 17 Ut. 381, 53
P. 1038t can by analogy be applied to Title 78 of the Exemption
Statute of the State of Utahr wherein the Court held in this
case, that the exemption conferred by statute is not a privilege
conferred upon the head of a family/ but an absolute right
intended to secure and protect exempt property against creditors,
as a means of support to every family in the State, and it
is submitted that, therefore, the exemptions provided in Title 78
should apply to the wife as well as to the husband (Emphasis
added).
It is further submitted to the Court, that the analogy
as between the Homestead Exemption rights and the exemptions
provided in Title 78 be treated in the same manner as this
Court held in Panagopulos v. Manning, 69 P.2d 614, Supreme
Court of Utah (1937), wherein this Court held that the exemptions
provided under the homestead right is founded on public policy
and that the statute provides that the homestead shall be
exempt from Judgment or lien or from execution or for sale
is remedial, and must be broadly construed to accomplish its
beneficent purpose.
This Court has previously stated and has repeatedly
held, that the homestead right as provided for in 28-1-1,
Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, is founded on public

policy and is fundamental to in the making of good citizens
in a free government and is one of the foundation stones upon
which stability of government rests, and that the statute
is remedial in order to accomplish its beneficent purpose.
The citations in support of this view of the Court is found
in Kimball v. Salisbury, supra; Hansen v. Mauss, 40 Ut. 361,
121 P. 605? Payson Exchange Saving Bank v. Tietjen, 63 Ut.
321, 225 P. 598; Utah Builders Supply Company v. Gardiner,
86 Ut. 250, 39 P.2d 327.

It is submitted that there should

not be a distinction as between the Court's holding in regards
to the Homestead Exemption Act as against the more life and
family sustaining exemptions set forth by statute in Title
78-23-1 (1 through 14), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953,
and as amended laws of Utah 1969).
POINT II
WIFE CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF HER PERSONAL PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The wife is not a Defendant to the action on appeal
before this Court and was not a party-Defendant in the Lower
Court.
The Legislature of Utah, and in whom the Constitution
vests the exclusive right to enact law, has formerly declared
in Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, that:

The Common Law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the United States or the Constitution
or laws of this State ** is hereby adopted, and
shall be the rule of decision in all Courts of
this State.
In Johnson v. Union Pacific Coal Company, 28 Ut. 146,
76 P. 1089, the Utah Supreme Court declared that, "the Common
Law of England" so referred to refers to that law as of the
date of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776.
There is no provision of the Utah Constitution nor by
the statutes of the State of Utah specifically repugnant to an
estate by the entirety as to the personal property of a husband
and wife and such estate did exist under the Common Law, as well
as an estate by the entirety as to real property.
There are a number of statutory instances wherein the
Legislature of the State of Utah has enacted statutes which
makes specific reference to tenancies by the entirety as a
possible estate and by lending support to the Common Law concept
of estates by the entirety of both personal and real property.
In 78-41-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, this
statute makes reference to possible estates existing in the
State of Utah, and specifically refers to a tenancy by the
entirety as a possible estate which would be effected by the
termination of a life estate in reference therein.
-8-

In 48-1-4(2), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953,
the Statute sets forth the rules for determining the existence
of a partnership and the type of estate that may exist thereunder, and makes reference to the effect of particular statutes
as to a tenancy by the entireties.
27 A.L.R. 826 makes a definition of a marital estate
and the nature of it is set forth therein as follows:
An estate of the entirety exists only between husband
and wife, being an outgrowth of the marital relation
based upon the theory of the legal unity of the two;
it is, however, a unit of indivisible parts vesting in two distinct persons Chusband and wife) who
are, however, regarded in law as one and the same.
In this regard, the estate differs from a joint
tenancy. Because of the indivisibility of the
estate and the fact that it vests absolutely in
the survivor/ a very serious question has been
presented as to whether or not any portion of
the estate may be subjected to the payment of the
individual debts of one of the spouses.
An estate by the entirety is a form of co-ownership
in real and personal property held by husband and wife with
right of survivorship.

Its essential characteristic is that

each spouse is seized per tout et non per my; that is of the
whole or one of the entirety and not of a share, moiety, or
divisible part as was defined in Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529,
134 A. 494; C.I.T. Corporation v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d
126.
-9-

It is, therefore, submitted to this Court, that the
Appellant in bringing an action against the Respondent only,
without including the wife in said action, could not destroy
the interest of the wife in the household furnishings and no
possession of the collateral of the property, which was the
property as much that of the wife as of the Respondent, could
be achieved and perfected without the wife being a party to
such action.
In Louis Licker, et ux, v. Gluskin, 164 N.E. 613,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Common
Law rights and disabilities of both husband and wife attach
to the interest and title of each arising under a tenancy by
the entirety, and that the tenancy of the husband and wife in
the entirety is essentially a tenancy modified by the Common Law
theory of unity of husband and wife, in that they do not take
by moieties, but by entireties.

The Court further held that

the characteristic of a tenancy by the entirety at Common Law
continues unaffected by the modern statutes designed to
ameliorate the rights of married women at Common Law and to
render more flexible and individual the property rights of
husband and wife.

The Court further held:

That these indubitable Common Law rules require
the conclusion, that a creditor cannot do with
a right of a tenant by the entirety that which
the tenant cannot do.
-10-

It is further submitted to the Court, that the
Argument of the Appellant as set forth in its Brief before
this Court and which Argument is based purely upon the
application of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code in establishing the rights of the Appellant, was the
Argument used in the Lower Court and considered by the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde and there is not much more to add
to his findings, wherein the Court held:
The evidence indicates, however, that the
Defendant's wife has an ownership interest in
the property. The Defendant's wife was not a
party to the contract. It is not a question
of priorities of security interest. Defendant's
wife's ownership interest is superior to
Plaintiff's security interest. Defendant
cannot defeat an ownership interest of another
party by making a warranty of ownership.
Defendant's warranty of ownership may well
make the obligation between Plaintiff and
Defendant non-dischargeable from misrepresentation, however, this Court cannot order him
to deliver possession of property he does not
own. Defendant's wife is not a party to the
contract or to this action, and an Order from
this Court depriving her of possession of
property she owns would not be lawful. (R-39)
In Parry v. Bonneville Irrigation District, 263 P.
751r Supreme Court of Utah (Jan., 1928), this Court held:
It is, of course, an elementary rule of law,
that there can be no judicial action affecting
vested rights that is not based upon some
process or notice whereby the interested
parties are brought within the jurisdiction
of a judicial tribunal about to render Judament.
-11-

In Johnson v. Hattram, et aly 275 P. 913, Supreme
Court of Oregon (1929), the Court held that where there was
no evidence attempting to show that the wife had any connection with the transaction out of which the Plaintiff's right
of action arose, or that her husband was her agent, or had
authority to transact business for her, that the wife could
not be jointly liable with the husband in an action for
money had and received*
It should be further noted by the Court, that the
parties are still husband and wife at the time of the action
and at the present time, and that there has been no evidence
offered by the Plaintiff to the contrary nor to attempt
to prove that the husband and wife are living in separate
establishments.

The wife has been in possession of the

property at all times relative to the matter before the Court,
and the solution of the Appellant, that the Appellant be
allowed to obtain possession of the property of the wife with
the wife having a right to file a suit against her husband for
a loss suffered by her as provided under Section 70A-9-112 of
the Commercial Code, is hardly a workable solution to the
depriving of the wife of her ownership and interest in the
household furnishings. (App.Br., p.3)
-12-

CONCLUSION
It isf therefore, submitted to this Honorable Court,
that the Judgment of the Lower Court denying to the Appellant
the right to deprive the wife of possession of property in
which she has an ownership interest and which consists of
the household goods purchased by the joint efforts of the
Respondent-husband and wife, cannot deprive the wife of such
necessities upon an allegation, that a knowledgeable lender
undertook to make a loan and seek a security interest against
the will of the wife upon the basis of an adhesion clause in
a contract which alleges that the Respondent, by making a
warranty of ownership, could divest the wife of her title and
interest to the family household goods•
Respectfully submitted,

By ^^^&

^?7' 3 ^ ^ —

PETE N. VLAHOS', ESQ, , and
STEPHEN W. FARR, ESQ.
Attorneys for Respondent
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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